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CASE COMMENTS
A RULE OF REASON FOR
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Continental v. Sylvania*
The American judiciary's enforcement of regulation of
economic agreements in restraint of trade, within a historically
laissez faire politico-socio-economic system,' is analogous to Lucifer
urging Gideon to blow the final trumpet. The mandates of the
federal antitrust statutes2 to control such undesirable economic ac-
tivity stem in part from the traditional American notion that non-
interference by government is the life blood of free enterprise and
open competition, even though all business agreements restrain
trade in one fashion or another.2 Today, governmental antitrust
lawyers find themselves in the awkward position of patrolling
business to keep competition free of agreements which unduly
restrain trade.
It is this very fundamental issue: how much should the govern-
ment regulate to adequately foster "workable competition," which
has perplexed antitrust experts and compounded the judiciary's in-
terpretation function.' Beginning with the inception of federal an-
titrust legislation in 1890, the courts have struggled to resolve basic
*537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, - U.S. - , 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977).
1. This antithesis, government regulation to preserve a semblance of a
laissez-faire economy, is fundamental to American antitrust jurisprudence. See notes
28-29 infra and accompanying test; H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ATITRUST POLICY 1-5,
112-113, 115 n.26 passim (1955) (hereinafter cited as THORELLI); See also BELLOC, The
Modern Man, in WHO OWNS AMERICA? 340 (H. Agar ed. 1970).
2. The basic antitrust legislation is the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. Act
of July 2, 1890 c. 647. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), as most recently amended
by Act of December 12, 1975, Public Law 94-145, effective March 11, 1976 [hereinafter
cited as Sherman]. Power to define anticompetitive conduct rests in the judiciary by
virtue of U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
3. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 10 (1911).
4. Competition operates to keep private markets working in socially accep-
table ways. Functioning ideally, private markets should: achieve efficient resource
allocations, stimulate the use of efficient methods of production and distribution of
quality goods and services at reasonable prices, conserve irreplaceable resources and
encourage high productivity through a progressive technology. Theoretically, the com-
bination of these elements contributes to a stable market. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22-27 (1970).
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antitrust questions. Thus, the validity of a restraint's business pur-
pose has been held to determine the degree of judicial scrutiny
which that particular restraint receives.' While some agreements
are now inherently more restrictive of trade,6 sometimes a company
must accept smaller market share simply because Congress pro-
hibited the business restraints necessary to reverse the declining
trend in its market." Considering these and similar issues represents
the substance of antitrust law on which a court focuses when deter-
mining the validity of economic agreements in restraint of trade.
The prohibition of vertical territorial arrangements' of a
manufacturer (vertical restraints) illustrates the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to resolve antitrust issues where seemingly contradictory
economic interests deserve protection. Without agreements defining
the parameters of the participants' responsibilities throughout the
distribution process, the ability to deliver goods to the marketplace
would be impaired and public confidence in the economic system
shaken.' Therefore, market efficiency "dictates" that restrictions
running from the manufacturer to the wholesaler/distributor form
an integral part of any efficient distribution system. A problem
5. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918).
6. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing
among competitors as a per se violation of Sherman § 1); United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1897).
7. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (ar-
rangements between competitors reasonable in light of deplorable economic conditions
in the bituminous coal mining industry).
8. Vertical agreements exist between persons at different levels of market
structure, i.e., among a manufacturer and its distributors-in contradistinction to
horizontal agreements among competitors at the same level of the market structure,
ie., among manufacturers or among distributors. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1967); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 253, 267 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring). For a more detailed discussion of the horizontal-vertical
distinction, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 424-29 (1966).
9. Four possible reasons why a manufacturer/supplier would prefer to use
vertical territorial arrangements are:
a. to increase the monopoly power of a supplier's dealers so that the
supplier can extract profits from them;
b. to increase the monopoly power of the supplier;
c. to increase the profits of the supplier and his dealers by providing
dealers with the means to engage in price discrimination.
d. to increase the supplier's efficiency as well as the efficiency of his
dealers.
R. WARREN, ANTITRUST IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 132 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WAR-
REN].
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arises, however, as these restrictions approach an unreasonable
limitation on the business opportunities of the participants.
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,1" the most recent
Supreme Court antitrust decision addressing vertical restrictions,
establishes a new means of determining whether an unreasonable
restraint exists. In Continental a dispute arose when a manufac-
turer of televisions granted a new distributorship to another
business approximately one mile from the manufacturer's then
leading distributor. Protesting the manufacturer's action, the
leading distributor began selling the manufacturer's televisions from
an unapproved location. Selling the television products without the
manufacturer's prior approval of the business site was a clear viola-
tion of the location restriction contained in the distributorship
agreement." The location clause prohibited dealers from opening
other outlets, especially in another dealer's territory, without the
approval of the manufacturer. 2 Using a per se test established
under existing law," the Northern District Court of California found
the location restriction to be a vertical agreement in restraint of
trade and violative of Section One of the Sherman Act.
Meeting en banc, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the rule of reason test" and reversed. According to the appellate
court the application of the rule of reason test was warranted by its
finding that the manufacturer's location clause was potentially less
harmful than those restrictions prohibited by existing law. The
Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Powell, affirmed the circuit
court's decision. Thus, Sylvania specifically overruled the application
of a per se test to vertical restraints on goods purchased by the
distributor.
10. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976),
affd, - U.S. - , 97 S.Ct. 2549 (1977).
11. Id. at 2551.
12. The location clause, clearly a restraint on trade, limits the number of
distributorships in a given area. Its primary purpose is to maximize manufacturers'
sales by increasing the quality of dealer services. Louis, Vertical Distributional
Restraints under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a
Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REv. 275, 282 n.36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Louis].
13. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). Schwinn
established a per se test as the correct standard for the evaluation of vertical restric-
tions on a manufacturer's goods which had been purchased by a distributor.
14. Using the rule of reason test, a court evaluates the restraint under all the
particular circumstances, announced initially in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United
States, see note 3 supra.
15. See note 13 supra.
1977]
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Understanding the Sylvania decision requires familiarity with
the antitrust standards-the per se test and the rule of reason
test-an understanding of the economic effects which vertical
restraints have on intraband and interbrand competition," and some
knowledge of the history and development of antitrust law. This
comment will thus begin with a general history of antitrust law
leading up to the change initiated by Sylvania.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
During the twenty-five years between the Civil War and
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, the American
economic system experienced structural change from an agrarian to
an industrial system.17 Although many political and socio-economic
factors contributed to the metamorphosis, this comment focuses on
those of special significance to the genesis of antitrust.
Perhaps the most critical feature of this transformation was
the trend toward economic concentration.' During the "Golden Era
of Capitalism," the attainment of monopoly power was generally
acknowledged to be the primary avenue to achieve the most effi-
cient cost and distribution of goods. 9 Consequently, the development
16. Interbrand competition occurs among distributors of the same brand, e.g.,
among different manufacturers (or distributors) of Sealy mattresses- in contradistinc-
tion to interbrand competition among distributors of different brands, e.g., among
manufacturers for distributors) of Sealy and Simmons mattresses. ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION
(1977).
17. See THORELLI, supra note 1, at 62-63. Social struggle between the
monopolists (interests of concentrated power) and anti-monopolists (small independent
proprietorships) crystallized. "Monopoly exists when a specific individual or enterprise
has sufficient control over a particular product or service to determine significantly
the terms on which other individuals shall have access to it."
18. This was characterized by the increasing visibility of "loose" and "tight"
combinations. Loose combinations did not infringe substantially on their members'
.sovereignty, e.g., gentleman's agreement and pools. As the trend toward concentration
intensified, the tighter forms of combination were adopted of which the trust is the
best example. Gentlemen's agreements and pools tended to disintegrate, but in the
tight agglomeration of the trust, the relationship was permanent. Thus the trust was
recognized as the most sophisticated of these corporate aids to economic concentration.
Once the holding company became available as an instrument for the con-
duct of enterprise, its uses began to multiply. Most important of all is its
use as the most effective device yet invented for combining under a single
control and management the properties of two or more hitherto indepen-
dent corporations.
E. JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1921).
19. The Golden Era of capitalism refers to the period in American history
generally between 1870 and 1900. See THORELLI. supra note 1, at 259.
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of sophisticated corporate devices to assist efforts in achieving
monopoly status became foremost in the minds of the leading en-
trepreneurs.' The rise of business trust arrangements provides the
classic illustration since a shift in popular sentiment against these
corporate trust activities gave rise to the countervailing antitrust
legislation."
The goal of antitrust legislation was the preservation and
fostering of open and free competition. Yet it was this freedom to
compete which had resulted in the monopoly and other economic
concentrations. With the concentration of economic interests,
however, came restrictive contracts used to assure the continuation
of achieved market power.
Proponents of trusts asserted that the trend towards
monopolization was the natural and inevitable outcome of superior
performance in the marketplace.' This view was supported by the
existence of large economies of scale characteristic of monopolies."
Opponents to the trusts perceived the concentration of economic
power in the hands of a few individuals as a threat to the century
old republic. ' This fear of an economically-oriented oligopoly (a few
producers in a given market) being substituted for the
20. The need for heavy fixed capital investment for efficient use of mass-
producing facilities and inconsistent monetary policy were important incentives to con-
centration. See Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market
Failure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1972).
21. Contra, J. CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST POLICY (1931); But see Destler,
Wealth Against Commonwealth, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 49 (Oct. 1944).
22. United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); A. CARNEGIE,
THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 81, 82 (ed. 1933) (Social Darwinism expresses the belief that
monopoly is the logical outcome of a struggle where the strong emerge supreme.).
23. One traditional common belief now discarded, was that in the cases of tem-
porary overexpansion of particular industries (repression exhibited by underconsump-
tion of goods), fixed costs prevented rapid transfer of capital. Given the necessity for
existing facilities to be functional to defray overhead costs, many businesses were run
at a loss. This result was a byproduct of an economy adjusting itself to radically chang-
ed fixed income and variable cost relationships, while the long-term price generally
receded. With the economic environment thus altered, unless a business could compete
at monopoly level, it faced extinction. These economic realities spurred the belief in
monopolies' economies of scale (the larger the company, the lower the cost of doing
business). See WARREN. supra note 9.
24.
A plutocracy is a political form in which the real controlling force is
wealth. This is the thing which seems to me to be really new and really
threatening; there have been states with wealth and power, but none in
which wealth seemed to have such absorbing and controlling power as it
threatens us.
W. SUMMER, ESSAYS OF WILLIAM SUMNER 404-409 (1934).
1977]
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constitutionally based democracy grew as numerous instances of
political graft by various trusts were disclosed.25 Concomitant with
the fear of oligopolistic control was the notion that the small in-
dependent proprietor's opportunity for successful business diminish-
ed as the trusts/monopolies invaded both old and emerging in-
dustries."
It is important to remember that the trend toward economic
concentration and the resulting demand for its social control are
both premised historically on the notion of freedom. It becomes
logically impossible therefore to support both interests
simultaneously; in antitrust litigation, they are diametrically op-
posed.' In a market place where freedom to compete exists, both in-
terests may be entitled to governmental protection. The following
hypothetical example will illustrate the difficulty. Company A with
49% of the market purchases Company B whose 10% decline in
market share was reflected as growth by A over a three year
period. Company B or the government claims Company A engaged
in anticompetitive practices. Is A being singled out because of A's
success and B's inability to compete or has A exceeded the bounds
of competition and infringed upon B's right to compete? Each has an
interest; both deserve protection.
25. The following reinforced the popular notion that trusts were fast becom-
ing invincible. One legislator was first bought by Vanderbilt for $75,000; he next sold
out to Vanderbilt's competitor Gould for $100,000. F. SHANNON, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 492 (1934).
26. Farmers, small businesses, and labor unions individually during different
stages of society's economic transformation had confrontations with trusts, tending to
restrict their individual liberty. See THORELLI, supra note 1, at 149. See also Twelfth
Census Reports, Vol. 7 (1902) (percentage of industries moving toward large scale con-
centration unmistakable).
27.
A general application of the Act to all combinations of business and
capital organized to suppress commercial competition is in harmony with
the spirit and impulses which gave it birth. "Trusts" and "monopolies"
were the terror of the period. Their power to fix prices, to restrict pro-
duction, to crush small independent traders and to concentrate large
power in the few to the detriment of the many were but some of the evils
ascribed to them.
United States v. Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 553, 554 (1943) (insurance companies
held subject to Sherman Act § 1).
This reflects the common law notion, codified by the Sherman Act, that com-
petition is the interest to be served. At the point economic power becomes so concen-
trated that the opportunity of others in the industry to compete does not exist, the
threat of monopoly requires a limitation on the monopolist's "right to compete."
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph Seagrams and Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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The central inquiry of the court conducting any antitrust
analysis is whether the economic interest protected or sanctioned by
the judicial decision is consistent with the Sherman Act's purpose.
To maximize competition" courts use two radically different prin-
ciples, the per se test and rule of reason test, the purpose of each
being the evaluation of economic conduct.
THE Two STANDARDS: PER SE RULE AND RULE OF REASON
Developed early in the history of antitrust law, the per se rule
is applied to agreements and practices directly restraining competi-
tion." For example, an agreement between competitors to fix prices
without apparent legitimate business purpose has the effect of stifl-
ing competition, therefore the application of the per se rule is ap-
propriate. Whenever the restriction directly restrains trade without
sufficiently valid justification the per se test is applicable. If the
28. The primary objective of the antitrust laws is to make the United States
economy competitive. United States v. Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1943).
Modern scholars have adopted a term that permits a progressive approach to
some inherent inconsistencies with our historically rooted laissez faire economy. A
structural approach, "workable competition" has two formal elements and four infor-
mal elements. One formal requirement is that a firm has the ability by a decrease in
price to attract customers from its competitors. In economic terms, its demand func-
tion has a greater elasticity than the other producers. The other formal requirement is
that the market be composed of firms able to slightly affect the market individually,
hold their own and be encouraged to compete. The informal requirements for workable
competition are: 1) consumer competence, 2) ability of firms to protect their com-
petitive position, 3) willingness of firms to compete aggressively, but 4) fairly (offer
better quality products closer to costs). See note 32 infra; M. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A
DYNAMIC PROCESS (Washington D.C. The Brookings Institution 1961).
29. The current statement of the per se rule seems to establish a much higher
standard than when first utilized in United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, supra note 6.
Today the party alleging a per se violation must show the practices or agreement has
a pernicious effect or that it lacks any redeeming social value. Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (emphasis added). The family of restraints routinely
classified by courts as per se violations has increased since Trans-Missouri to include
agreements to: fix prices, Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964); boycott, Ra-
diant Burners, Inc., v. People's Gas, Light and Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), per
curium reversing, 273 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1959); Klor's, Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941); horizontal
division of market, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599
(1951); make tying arrangements (conditional sale of needed product tied to another
product for no valid reason), United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1958); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); foreclose the market through monopolistic con-
duct, United States v. Griffin, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948), American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 808-15 (1946), Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
395-96 (1905).
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practice is once found per se illegal, courts will not inquire into the
business purpose for the questioned practice, nor entertain any
defenses.2 Because of its potential severity, courts limit the per se
rule to that class of restraints clearly offensive to competition and
historically without any valid business purpose in a free-enterprise
system."
The rule of reason test functions by distinguishing those
restraints unduly limiting competition from those which may be
reasonable.' In applying this test, a court should carefully examine
the nature of the restraint, its purported purpose, the effect on com-
petition and whether the restraint exceeds its purpose." In essence,
the rule of reason is a balancing test measuring the competitive ef-
fect and the reasonableness of the restriction by weighing the
catalogue of business factors against the potential harm to competi-
tion." Under this standard a business practice may adversely affect
competition yet still be lawful.'
The necessity of applying the rule of reason to such varying
circumstances oftentimes seems to dictate a loose application by the
judiciary, subjecting the courts to the criticism that they make deci-
sions under a per se rule while dressing the opinion in rule of reason
terminology. To the extent that this is true, the semblance of logical
development of each rule becomes blurred. To avoid confusion some
contemporary antitrust scholars suggest viewing the per se doctrine
as a special application of the rule of reason, while others contend
that the rule of reason is an outgrowth of the per se test.'
Regardless of which position is correct, when judicial experience
finally concludes certain conduct is either harmful to competition,
30.
Since the purpose and effect of this combination, its tendency to monopo-
ly ... brought it within the policy declared by Sherman ... it was not er-
ror to refuse to hear the evidence ... the reasonableness of the methods
to accomplish unlawful object is no more material than would be the
reasonableness of prices fixed by unlawful competition.
Fashion Guild v. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
31. United States v. Underwriters' Ass'n, 322 U.S. 553 (1943).
32. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (all cases rest
on premise that reason was guide by which the provision was interpreted). See note 3
supra at 65.
33. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 187, 188 (1977) (analysis is necessary to determine
whether a particular practice will restrain or aid competition).
34. 1I at 189.
35. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918).
36. For commentary in support of a structural or "truncated" approach for
vertical restraint cases, see Comment, Franchising Restrictions, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 957,
964 (1974).
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void of economic justification or without benefit to society, judicial
economy dictates application of the per se doctrine. 7 Under the rule
of reason test, the court evaluates the restriction in question in light
of business factors appropriate under the circumstances to deter-
mine the reasonableness of the restraint in question.
White Motor Co. and Arnold Schwinn: Background to Sylvania
Prior to White Motor Co. v. United States," a vertical restraint
case, horizontal arrangements dividing market territories between
distributors were determined to be illegal per se. 9 In White Motor
Co., the manufacturer in restricting its distributors to specific
customers and territories"0 contended that the distribution system
was necessary to compete with other major truck manufacturers.'
The majority of the Court concluded there was too little information
on vertical restraints to apply the per se test."2 Concurring, Mr.
Justice Brennan noted the importance of determining whether: (a)
interbrand competition was more significant than intrabrand com-
petition; (b) the arrangement was induced by the dealers; and (c)
such arrangements were a prerequisite for survival and effective
competition for independent truck manufacturers. The necessity of
considering these factors suggested applying a rule of reason to ver-
tical restraints.'3
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clark emphasized that under
these vertical contracts, a customer was compelled to deal with one
seller who had sole power to set terms." Relying on precedent, ' he
observed that the existence of interbrand competition had been
37. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
38. 372 U.S. 253 (1962).
39. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
40. Manufacturer prohibited distributors from selling outside territory and
reserved major municipal, state, and federal accounts to itself. See note 39 supra.
41. Competition with other manufacturers in the industry equals interbrand
competition. See note 16 supra
42. "We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which
these arrangements emerge to be certain [about applying a per se rule to vertical
restraints] .... We need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these ar-
rangements." See note 39 supra.
43. Except when "the dealer who cross-sells runs the risk under the agree-
ment of losing his franchise altogether, intrabrand competition across territorial boun-
daries involves serious hazards which might deter any effort to compete." Id. at 273
(Brennan, J., concurring). Assuming a rule of reason approach, the language suggests
an exception where the franchise is vulnerable to retaliatory action by a manufacturer.
44. Id. at 275.
45. United States v. McKesson and Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
1977]
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traditionally insufficient to support an explicit agreement to
eliminate intrabrand competition."' Notwithstanding disagreement
among the Justices, White Motor Co. left unanswered the question
of which of these standards should be applied to vertical restraints.
Four years after the White Motor Co. decision, the Supreme
Court applied the harsh per se test to some of the vertical
restraints imposed by Schwinn on its distributors. An elaborate set
of restrictions prompted the Court to draw a distinction between
purchased goods and goods handled by the distributor on a consign-
ment basis.47 Relying on the ancient rule against restraints on aliena-
tion, 8 the Court held any vertical restrictions on those goods which
the distributor had purchased were subject to the per se prohibi-
tion. Where the manufacturer retained title, dominion and risk of
loss, however, the vertical restrictions were to be evaluated by the
rule of reason test."9
Schwinn received almost universal condemnation from an-
titrust lawyers and economists." This criticism focused mainly on
use of the ancient rule against alienation as the basis for in-
validating some vertical restrictions and not others." The distinction
appeared empty and useless.2 From the economic standpoint the ef-
fect vertical restraints had on intrabrand and interbrand competi-
tion was not altered by the passage of title to the goods."
Reflecting the overall disenchantment with this distinction,
lower courts narrowly construed Schwinn, and refused to apply the
per se test even though the vertical restrictions clearly fell within
the categories prohibited by the Schwinn decision. This extensive
rejection of Schwinn by the lower courts underscored the wholesale
46. The late Justice Clark adamantly held that the restraint's vertical nature
did not make it less an offense to the purpose behind the Sherman Act.
47. 372 U.S. 253, 275 (1962). United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967).
48. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), held
resale price maintenance arrangements invalid once manufacturer's goods merged into
stream of trade (after purchase by another).
49. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
50. "[Almost all commentators deplore the opinion as unforgiveably bad." See
note 12 supra at 275, 276 (1976).
51. Id. at 276 n.6.
52. "It is particularly disappointing to see the Court balk at the label 'sale'
and turn from a reasoned response to a wooden and irrelevant formula." 388 U.S. at
394 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
53. The Schwinn Court gave two reasons for its decision neither of which
had anything to do with economics. See WARREN. supra note 9, at 149.
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dissatisfaction with the Schwinn doctrine." Thus, of the few cases
invalidating vertical restrictions purportedly under Schwinn, most
involved vertical price-fixing in addition to territorial restraints."
Schwinn answered the question left open in White Motor Co.
as to which test applied to vertical restraints. Yet the sea was far
from calm. The Ninth Circuit case, Continental v. Sylvania" provid-
ed the Supreme Court an opportunity to significantly clarify an-
titrust law on the important issue of vertical restraints.
Continental v. Sylvania
In 1962 GTE Sylvania, dissatisfied with its one to two per cent
national sales of televisions terminated the saturation method of
distribution in favor of the more modern selective distributional
system.57 Sylvania abandoned distribution through wholesalers and
decided to sell only to selected retailers who would promote the
Sylvania brand. It is undisputed that title to the television sets pass-
ed to these retailers. This plan, by limiting the number of franchises
in a given area, would reduce intrabrand competition among
retailers and serve as an incentive to carry and promote its pro-
ducts." Under this new program sales were made directly to a
limited number of franchised dealers. A provision in the distributor-
ship agreement specifically prohibited the franchisee from opening
additional retail outlets at different locations without the manufac-
turer's approval. 9 This law suit resulted from the manufacturer's en-
54. See Colorado Pump and Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.
19), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973) (primary responsibility clause); Joseph E. Seagram
and Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke and Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (exclusive dealership); Supeira Bedding Co. v. Serta
Associates, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (primary responsibility and profit
pass-over clauses). A primary responsibility clause is an agreement obligating a
distributor to concentrate his sole efforts in a specified geographical area for which he
is primarily responsible. These clauses were endorsed in White Auto Co. v. United
States similarly to the location clause in Arnold, Schwinn via the consent decree.
55. These cases flow more logically from the vertical price-fixing line of cases,
arguably, justifying the application of Schwinn. E.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Coors Co.,
506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
56. See note 10 supra.
57. The essence of this program is a reduction in personnel with increased at-
tention on franchises selected individually to cultivate a particular market. Selective
distribution differs substantially from the post World War II saturation distribution
technique which sought to flood the market with products in anticipation of increased
sales volume.
58. See note 10 supra at 2550.
59. A manufacturer or franchisor seeks to maximize the extent of control to
insure the market will "support" the products. In reality, the manufacturer
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forcement of the location clause when one of its distributors began
selling the television products from an unauthorized location.' The
Supreme Court upheld the location restriction under the rule of
reason standard, specifically overruling Schwinn.
In overruling Schwinn, the Court in Sylvania recognized that
vertical restraints have the dual characteristics of simultaneously
reducing intrabrand competition and stimulating interbrand com-
petition."' Since the Schwinn court failed to evaluate the challenged
restrictions on the basis of their individual potential for intrabrand
harm or interbrand benefit,"2 but rather assumed the form of the
transaction dictated the competitive impact of the restriction, the
Schwinn analysis was considered superficial and defective.' Without
legitimate criteria determining the degree of either intrabrand harm
or interbrand benefit, the imposition of a per se standard based on
the form of the transaction is itself unreasonable and unfair to the
business community. By discounting Schwinn's distinction between
sale and non-sale transactions" and characterizing it as "essentially
unrelated to any relevant economic impact,"" Sylvania overrules
Schwinn on the ground that vertical restrictions promote interbrand
competition.
After eliminating the basis for the Schwinn distinction, the
Sylvania Court examined the question of whether to expand the per
se application to all vertical restraints regardless of the form. Finding
no compelling reason to so expand the per se rule, the Court con-
cluded the pernicious effect test" should determine whether vertical
manipulates the market artificially by differentiating his product to the consumer. One
aspect of this market manipulation is the establishment of a limited number of outlets
in a given area. See Louis, supra note 12, at 284.
60. The notion of free enterprise normally rewards the independent,
agressive, small businessman. See note 30 supra (specifically disallowing agreements to
combine for the limited purpose of restricting competition).
61. __ U.S. __, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 2551 (1977).
62. Id
63. Since the mobility of consumers neutralizes any artifical stabilizing effect
a location clause may have, in the interests of free competition it is unnecessary to
permit location clauses at all conceding as the majority does, that a restraint results
on competition.
64. Schwinn applied a per se standard to a manufacturer's restrictions on
goods purchased by a distributor but used the rule of reason for restriction on goods
where title remained in the manufacturer.
65. There is no mention of a balancing test, but the court has assumed that a
franchisor has the right to control the product after it has been purchased. ld.
66. Interbrand competition between manufacturers is not so desperately
fragile that the court must require the narrow, "pernicious, without any redeeming
value," standard to test a possible antitrust violation. One scholar argues the adoption
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restraints should escape per se application. In rather cavalier
fashion the Court concluded its decision to overrule Schwinn with
the following caveat: "[Tlhe possibility is not foreclosed that par-
ticular application of vertical restraints may still justify a per se
standard under Northern Pac. R. Co.""7 Such an application should
be withheld until a clear negative effect has been demonstrated. 8
THE LOGIC OF THE SYLVANIA RATIONALE
Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion exposes the weakness
in the majority's reasoning, while providing guidelines for lower
courts seeking to resolve vertical restraint questions consistent with
antitrust principles. Notwithstanding his concurrence in the result,
Justice White would not have overruled Schwinn.
His first observation is the recognition that the restrictions
condemned in Schwinn and challenged in Sylvania differ substantial-
ly in their effects on intrabrand competition. The Arnold Schwinn
Co. employed a system of interrelated vertical restraints, one of
which, a customer restriction, prohibited the bicycle sales by fran-
chised retailers to non-franchised retailers. While the majority in
Sylvania states the effect of Schwinn's customer restriction and
Sylvania's location clause is indistinguishable, Justice White il-
lustrates a major difference between the two. 9 Assume that in-
trabrand competition is sufficiently weak so that franchised retailers
can charge a price substantially above wholesale. Under a location
restriction, one franchised retailer may lower its price and sell to
discount stores seeking to exploit the potential sales at prices below
the prevailing retail level. Under a retail customer restriction,
however, the franchised dealers can not sell to discounters and the
opportunity for intrabrand competition is eliminated." This dif-
ference of effect on competition merits greater consideration than
the majority concedes." The majority correctly observes that both
of a partial per se test could provide a more stable set of criteria for the business com-
munity to follow and the courts to apply. See Louis, supra note 12.
67. Unfortunately there is no example of what combination of vertical
restraints will be pernicious enough to justify the application of the Northern P. Ry.
test. See note 30 supra. Under a traditional, rule of reason analysis, Schwinn had
market power and restrictions but yet Schwinn was not horrible enough to justify a
"pernicious, lack of redeeming value" test since the court overruled Schwinr.
68. - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 2551 (1977).
69. Id. at 2552.
70. Id
71. There is a trend towards greater concentration of power by the franchis-
ing industry. "The recent phenomenal expansion of franchised business dates back only
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restraints restrict the retailer's freedom to dispose of his goods.
However, in a location restriction, a retailer remains free to sell to
any customer in any area. Such freedom was simply non-existent
within Schwinn restrictions.
In light of the primary importance placed on interbrand com-
petition"2 by the majority, it is worthwhile to examine the factors
relevant to the majority's final determination. By virtue of its domi-
nant market position and the superior consumer acceptance of its
product, the Schwinn bicycle company posed a much greater threat
to the achievement of traditional antitrust goals against forms of
economic concentration than did Sylvania in the television market."
Established economic theories suggest that market share and pro-
duct differentiation may be used as criteria to measure market
power."
If the majority's emphasis on interbrand competition supports
its holding in Sylvania, it also argues most strongly against overrul-
ing Schwinn. With its market share and product differentiation,
there was little danger of Schwinn suffering extinction from inter-
brand competition. Without the business justification of a failing
company, arguably available in Sylvania,75 Schwinn's restrictions
were totally unwarranted."
Mr. Justice White finds two reasons that provide a "principled
basis" for refusing to extend Schwinn to location clauses. Ironically,
to about 1950 .. . [and equal] about 10% of the gross national product or $59.215
billion." D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND ANTITRUST 26, 27 (1971).
72. Interbrand's importance seems the basis to apply a rule of reason test for
location clauses. But given the 22 per cent market share that Schwinn controlled, com-
bined with the substantial number of foreign bicycles in the market, Schwinn would
seem to have approached monopoly status relative to other American bicycle com-
panies. If the majority actually wanted to promote interbrand competition, the
Schwinn restrictions should have been removed since their existence permit a greater
market share.
73. Id.
74. See P. AREEDA. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 500-04 (2nd ed. 1974) (If both a
manufacturer and its dealers believe that the use of distributional restraints will
create or preserve promotional differential market power, they will ordinarily concur
in their position.).
75. Sylvania experienced an increase of three per cent national sales after
adoption of its selective distributive program. By being in the market, competition has
been protected.
76. Schwinn was not a failing company, nor entering the market for the first
time, or marketing a new product. These three situations were enumerated in United
States v. White Motor Co. as possible circumstances justifying a rule of reason stan-
dard being applied to vertical restraints. See note 44 supra.
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both are relied upon by the majority to overrule Schwinn. One is
the check on the exploitation of intrabrand competition provided by
interbrand competition.7 Since the consumer has the ability to
substitute one television brand for another, he has protection from
outrageous prices at the retail level. This possibility of consumer
choice exists by virtue of multiple manufacturers in the television
market. The potential benefits vertical restraints offer to interbrand
competition is the second reason. Mr. Justice White would limit
Schwinn's application. 8
It is in his misgivings about the overruling of Schwinn that the
analysis of Mr. Justice White provides illumination for lower courts'
future confrontations with vertical restraints. The basis for the
Schwinn distinction between sale and consignment of goods affirmed
the traditional antitrust notion that "independent businessmen
should have the freedom to dispose of goods as they see fit."'79 This
reasoning, suggests the majority, misinterpreted the purpose behind
the Schwinn Court's application of both the per se rule and the rule
of reason. In other words the Schwinn Court merely used the
Schwinn rule as a convenient description of the most dangerous
restraints, which arguably should be per se unlawful anyway, and
that therefore it may be less arbitrary than heretofore believed. Ir-
respective of this criticism, Justice White concedes the majority
may be justified in determining that the potential benefit of inter-
brand competition outweighs the interests of the individual pro-
prietor.' This concession presupposes that economic efficiency was
the overriding purpose behind the Sherman Act.
Finally, Justice White expresses concern that the majority's
reliance on the "relevant economic impact" criteria for determining
per se violations of vertical restraints may have ramifications for
vertical price restraints." Since the same efficiency arguments for
non-price vertical restraints apply equally to vertical price
77. If the dealer only makes sales where marginal cost equals marginal
revenue, presumably he will not serve high cost customers. The consumer could
benefit from these savings. See Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions after Sealy and
Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BILL 1181, 1188-89 (1967).
78. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 49 supra.
80. 97 S.Ct. 2555. The analysis recognizes the overall importance of the
manufacturing sector of the economy. In protecting this trend toward concentration of
franchises which includes: services, soft drinks, automobiles, fastfoods and computers.
The permissive attitude of the present Court parallels that of the country prior to
passage of the Sherman Act. See notes 20-26 supra.
81. 97 S.Ct. 2555.
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restraints, this concern may alert the antitrust community.
Sylvania's longevity may well depend on whether the Supreme
Court is willing to adhere to its reliance upon the "relevant
economic impact" as the determinative criterion for evaluating ver-
tical restraints under the rule of reason approach.
IMPACT OF SYLVANIA ON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
By removing vertical restraints from the reach of the per se
application erected in Schwinn, the Court has issued a green light to
those manufacturers desiring to increase their distributional effi-
ciency through an expanded use of the franchise system.'
Presumably, manufacturers will court potential franchisees with in-
viting combinations of vertical restraints supported by a legally en-
forceable guarantee of minimum intrabrand competition. This may
well be the correct contemporary response to a market composed of
mobile consumers acclimated to suburbanization and conditioned by
mass advertising."
It is questionable, however, whether the consumer will benefit
from the net savings of the dealer/retailer who is thus insulated
from intrabrand competition. It is entirely possible that an increase
in the amount of customer services will artificially increase the dif-
ferentiation of products." Whether or not the consumer wants these
services he will pay for them, since the cost of providing them is in-
cluded in the over-all cost of the product. On the positive side, this
total package may be justified, especially if useful consumer infor-
mation can be provided by the dealer. Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S
Wholesalers, Inc.," decided after Sylvania, provides some indication
of use and treatment vertical restraints will receive in the im-
mediate future.
Adolph Coors (Coors), a Colorado corporation, sought to enjoin
A & S Wholesalers, Inc. (A & S), a North Carolina corporation, from
purchasing Coors beer from Colorado retailers and transporting it to
82. The trend towards concentration has threatened local or regional pro-
ducers in some industries with economic destruction. "In many [organizations of in-
dependent local businesses] the alternatives facing independent operators have clearly
been those of a synthesis with some sort of national group with continued independent
operation, or ultimate demise in favor of nationwide chains of manufacturing or service
establishments. D. THOMPSON, FRANCHISE OPERATIONS AND ANTITRUST (1971).
83. Id
84. See note 9 supra
85. Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., Nos. 76-1227, 1228, slip op.
at 13 (10th Cir. July 19, 1977).
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North Carolina for resale to retail outlets at a higher price than its
retail price in Colorado." Both parties appealed the judgment based
on a jury verdict in favor of Coors. The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals postponed a decision until the Sylvania opinion was handed
down.
Coors utilizes a unique brewing process designed to preserve
its special flavor and is the fourth largest national beer manufac-
turer. Coors contended it had the absolute right to: (1) determine
the area within which its beer products were to be marketed; and (2)
impose certain controls over the products following sale, then in the
hands of wholesalers and retailers, in order to protect the quality
and integrity of the products.
Following Sylvania, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
nature of the restriction need no longer be considered. Sylvania was
properly applied in light of the fact that the Tenth Circuit remanded
for a determination of the territorial restriction's reasonableness.
However, language in the opinion suggests possible confusion on
vertical restraints remains. 7 Contrary to the court's statement,
restrictions on goods where title remained in the manufacturer were
valid under Schwinn.88 On remand, the lower court must sua sponte
examine Coor's justification for the restraint. An inquiry, finding lit-
tle or no value in a territorial restraint for a uniquely processed pro-
duct, when it appears another restriction adequately protects the
essence of the product's integrity, would indicate judicial willingness
to follow Sylvania's rule of reason mandate. Otherwise, the adoption
of the rule of reason becomes as meaningless as the "irrelevant
distinction" discarded in Schwinn.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of antitrust law is to promote competition towards
the goals of preventing economic concentration and achieving a wide
choice of quality products or services at reasonable prices. The
broad public policy undergirding antitrust is that in the long run the
courts wish to maintain a "workable competition," that is: sufficient
firm rivalry to attain ultimate consumer goals (quality goods at
86. Id at 3.
87. "[Elven should a manufacturer retain dominion or control with respect to
these goods, and if the dealers' positions and functions are indistinguishable from those
of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer, then the restrictions are examined via
the rule of reason." Id at 12, 13. Assuming the court meant "release" instead of "re-
tain," Sylvania received proper interpretation.
88. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
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reasonable prices), but not so much rivalry that smaller firms are
destroyed or taken over with resultant overly concentrated
economic power. The Court in Sylvania approves those vertical
restrictions which allow certain manufacturers protection of their
market share if there is sufficient competitive rivalry through inter-
brand competition.
The intent of the Supreme Court in Sylvania seems clear.
Lower courts are to no longer apply the harsh per se test to all
manufacturer imposed restrictions which restrain trade. They are
now to examine all the circumstances surrounding the restraint in
light of its anti-competitive effects when deciding the fate of
manufacturer restrictions under the rule of reason. Greater discre-
tionary power is vested in the lower courts to decide the ultimate
question: the impact of the restrictions on interbrand competition
under all of the facts and circumstances.
The per se rule permits judicial efficiency because it is easy to
apply. In this respect, it forewarns business firms that certain
restrictions will be held clearly invalid. The rule of reason invites
litigation since parties are never certain how a court will decide a
case until it has used the full rule of reason analysis. It is too early
to determine the quality of lower courts' analysis under the
Sylvania rule. The courts may use the rule to approve almost carte
blanche manufacturers' restrictions. If so, the pendulum will swing
far from the condemnation of manufacturer restrictions under
Schwinn to the protection of manufacturer restrictions. This will
substantially reduce intrabrand competition. Finally, it is also too
early to predict the specific impact on distributors. However, the
manufacturer's freedom to impose vertical restrictions could
adversely affect large and small distributors alike. Such a result
would hardly satisfy the American concept of free enterprise.
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